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I. INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional law’s commitment to a privacy right is not only problematic, but 
also unnecessary.  With the recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 2 the Court has laid 
the groundwork for finally rendering the right to privacy obsolete.  While lip service 
has been paid to the decision’s revolutionary character,3 most scholars have failed to 
realize its true conceptual import.4  That is, scholars have failed to realize that a 
repudiation of morals legislation—legislation based solely on morality—renders the 
substantive due process right to privacy obsolete.  
This article is set out in three parts.  Part II outlines the difficulties with the right 
to privacy.  Part III articulates the relationship between morals legislation and 
privacy, demonstrating that we no longer need the latter as long as the state eschews 
the former.  Part IV argues that the Court in Lawrence articulates a new standard of 
                                                                
1A.B., A.M. (Brown University), J.D. (Harvard Law); Ph.D. Student, Department of 
Political Science (Yale University).  I thank Bruce Ackerman and Ian Shapiro for their helpful 
comments on an earlier version.  I presented a version of this paper at the Yale Political 
Theory Workshop in September 2004.  I thank Monu Bedi for his invaluable help.  
2539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
3See Philip Chapman, Note, Beyond Gay Rights:  Lawrence v. Texas and the Promise of 
Liberty, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 245 (2004); Randy E. Barnett, Kennedy’s Libertarian 
Revolution, NAT’L REVIEW ONLINE (July 10, 2003), at http://www.nationalreview.com 
/comment/comment-barnett071003.asap. Both Chapman and Barnett essentially argue that the 
revolutionary character of the decision stems from the Court’s switch from a fundamental 
rights based analysis to a more liberty-centered approach.  While their arguments are not 
wrong, they miss the more important relationship between morals legislation and privacy.  
After all, liberty is the value to be promoted.  The question is how best to achieve it.  I argue 
that by repudiating morals legislation and rejecting the right to privacy we can less 
problematically ensure freedom.  Chapman and Barnett fail to capture this insight. 
4But see JEB RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 184-190 (2005); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications 
for Lawmaking Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2004).  Though 
Rubenfeld and Goldberg realize that the decision could call into question morals legislation, 
they fail to connect this to the right to privacy.   
447 
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rational review where specific appeal to morality is constitutionally suspect, allowing 
us to reject the right to privacy.    
II. THE PROBLEMATIC RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
My essay speaks to liberals—to those, for instance, who value sexual freedom—
to abandon the constitutional right to privacy and instead, stick with a conception of 
rational review that prohibits appeal to mere morality.  To be sure, those who reject 
sexual freedom may find my account unpersuasive or even offensive.  Nevertheless, 
if one believes—as I certainly do—that all consensual adult relationships ought to be 
equally permitted and acknowledged by the state, one should reject the right to 
privacy, and instead adopt a limitation on the constitutional grounds for justifying 
legislation. The purpose of this essay is to purge constitutional law of its 
longstanding right to privacy.  
Now, a general right to privacy can be taken to mean (and this is not an 
exhaustive list) my right to keep my thoughts to myself, my right not to have my 
home searched, my right not to have my appearance used without my consent, or my 
right to sleep with whomever I choose.  A right to privacy can be seen, for example, 
in tort law, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and in the right to property.5  My 
focus is on the right to privacy as manifested and articulated in Griswold v. 
Connecticut.6  That is, I understand the right to privacy as the right, grounded in the 
doctrine of substantive due process, that protects otherwise non-harmful behavior in 
private.  Presumably, constitutional law’s adherence to this right is meant to ensure 
our liberty.   After all, by subjecting state laws that regulate such intimate activities 
to strict scrutiny, constitutional law aims to protect our freedom.7
Nevertheless, this constitutional right to privacy suffers from at least two 
problems:  one constitutional, and the other normative.  First, there seems to be little 
textual basis in the Constitution for such a right.  In Griswold, for instance, Justice 
Stewart argues that while the Connecticut ban against the use of contraceptives may 
very well be a “silly law,” there is no provision in the Constitution that seems to 
invalidate it.8  John Ely argues that this appeal to substantive due process to 
articulate a right to privacy may be just as problematic as generating a right to 
contract under Lochner v. New York9 or, at the extreme, generating a right for 
slaveholders under Dred Scott v. Sandford. 10 11  Both cases appeal to substantive due 
                                                                
5 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). In their seminal article on privacy, Warren and Brandeis primarily discuss these other 
conceptualizations of privacy.  In this article, I tackle only the right to privacy that primarily 
concerns sexual freedom.  
6381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
7Although my article concerns only the problem of heightened scrutiny that accompanies 
presumptive violations of the substantive due process right to privacy, a repudiation of morals 
legislation may very well also relieve the need to appeal to suspect classification doctrine.  
8Griswold, 381 U.S.at 527. See also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605  (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
9198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state law imposing maximum number of hours one 
could work in a bakery). 
1060 U.S. 393 (1857) (commenting on due process rights of slaveholders in the context of 
the Missouri Compromise). 
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process.  Thus, we are faced with the difficulty that constructing such rights out of 
due process turns out a mere generational phenomenon.12  After all, as Ely goes on to 
state, “that attitude, of course, is precisely the point of the Lochner philosophy, 
which would grant unusual protection to those ‘rights’ that somehow seem most 
pressing, regardless of whether the Constitution suggests any special solicitude for 
them.”13  
Second, and more importantly, this right to privacy creates the problem of 
tolerance.   While liberal thought generally extols the value of tolerance,14 the right to 
privacy ultimately shields behavior by demeaning it.  Michael Sandel criticizes the 
right to privacy on this very basis.15 For instance, although much of society may find 
gay sex disgusting, it chooses to allow it to occur in the privacy of a bedroom. The 
appeal to privacy, as Sandel rightly argues, stigmatizes the act as deviant and 
abnormal.16  By forcing the act into the bedroom (this is the only way it can be 
protected), the act becomes unworthy of public consumption.  It is a shameful 
practice that must stay within the confines of a private space, or so this argument 
contends.   
It is critical to realize that toleration is permitting a deviation from a standard.17  
In this context, the standard is heterosexual, procreative sex between a man and a 
woman who are married.18  Thus, those engaging in the standard sexual practice have 
no need for the right to privacy.  There is no worry that a law will forbid the 
“standard” or “normal” sexual practice.  After all, the constitutional right to privacy 
arose in a case concerning the use of contraception.  Admittedly, while Griswold 
concerned married heterosexual couples, the sex was clearly non-procreative—hence 
the need for contraception and the appeal to privacy.  Before Griswold, there was no 
                                                           
 
 
11JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14-22 (1980). 
12John Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:  A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE  L.J. 920, 
939 (1973). 
13Id. 
14 Tolerance, in fact, seems the common refrain of the conventional liberal. 
15 MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 106-08 (1992). 
16 Id.  
17The American Heritage Dictionary defines tolerance as “leeway for variation from a 
standard.” AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 858 (4th ed. 2001).  In the religious context, 
Catholic theologian, John Murray writes that toleration “implies a moral judgment on error 
and the consequent adoption of a moral attitude, based on charity, toward the good faith of 
those who err.” JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:  CATHOLIC STRUGGLES WITH 
PLURALISM 150 (1993). Thus, religious toleration (as opposed to acceptance) means that the 
deviating religion is most certainly seen as in error.  However, due to privacy, such a practice 
is reluctantly permitted.  
18Of course, heterosexuals may also require the use of privacy.  To be sure, non-
procreative sex (oral sex, for example) may still be considered “abnormal” or “deviant.”  In 
this essay, when I refer to heterosexual sex, I mean procreative, monogamous sex carried out 
between one man and woman within the bounds of marriage.   
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question that married couples had a right to engage in procreative sex.  Such activity 
does not need privacy protection.    
Not surprisingly, no one ever says to the straight married couple about to engage 
in procreative, non-kinky sex, “what you do in your bedroom is your business!”  
This often-used mantra, under the right to privacy, applies only to those acts we 
disapprove of, but must begrudgingly tolerate in private. Certainly, murder and 
assault cannot take place in private.  Rather, privacy is used to protect those non-
harmful activities that the majority simply finds morally wrong or offensive. In this 
way, deviations or leeway from this standard require appeal to privacy.  The right to 
privacy, then, is necessary to protect only minority sexual practices that take place in 
private—i.e., behind closed doors.   
This method of protection, however, protects by simply tolerating certain 
behavior—by recognizing the non-procreative sex act (sodomy, for instance) as 
aberrant and anomalous, but allowing it anyway. While heterosexual sex within 
marriage, at least the monogamous, procreative kind, is no doubt valued in society, 
gay sex is short changed by being swept under the proverbial right to privacy rug.  It 
is seen as a deviation that is reluctantly permitted.  As Sandel writes, “by refusing to 
articulate the human goods that homosexual intimacy may share with heterosexual 
unions[,]” the right to privacy argument used to protect gay sex is woefully 
inadequate.19   
To be sure, this problem of tolerance is unavoidable.  For example, Jeb 
Rubenfeld’s attempt to justify the right to privacy fails on its own terms.20  He argues 
that such a right staves off normalization.  I argue, though, that even with a privacy 
right the state ends up engaging in a subtle form of normalization.  Rubenfeld 
contends that without such a right, the state can compel us to lead certain kinds of 
lives.  As a threshold matter, he rightly repudiates the personhood thesis as a possible 
explanation.21  The personhood thesis maintains that certain aspects of our lives are 
necessary for us to become true persons.22  Under this thesis, sexual acts, for 
example, define who we are or play a large role in our self-definition.  As a result, 
the state cannot exercise its power in regards to these things.  Even assuming, as 
Rubenfeld does, that we can figure out when self-definition is at stake—that is, when 
privacy should kick in—the problem is that sometimes we engage in these allegedly 
self-defining acts for reasons that have nothing to do with personhood.  I agree with 
Rubenfeld that one may partake in gay sex for purely physical pleasure having 
nothing at all to do with any gay-identity formation.23  The sex act itself should be 
protected, regardless of the actor’s intention or the act’s role in self-definition. 
Rubenfeld, then, opts for normalization as standing beneath the intuition of a 
right to privacy. Rubenfeld believes that such a right ensures that the government 
does not force or compel us to standardize ourselves, to live cookie-cutter lives.  For 
                                                                
19SANDEL, supra note 15, at 107. 
20Jeb Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989). 
21Id. at 782. 
22Id. at 752-54. 
23Rubenfeld also employs a republican and Foucault based analysis in his criticism of 
personhood. See id. at 761-82.  
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example, limiting sex only to heterosexual intercourse pushes us to lead a certain 
way of life.  Privacy prevents this standardization.   
 By invoking the right to privacy to protect certain behavior, however, we have 
ipso facto deemed it abnormal.  It is true that under Rubenfeld’s argument for the 
maintenance of the right to privacy, the state cannot stop me from having sex with a 
man.  Nevertheless, by the very fact that I must appeal to this right to protect my 
“life-style,” that I must take cover under privacy, the state has implicitly rendered my 
“life-style” abnormal and shameful.   As demonstrated above, this is Sandel’s very 
critique of the right to privacy.   
Since straight sex does not require the protection of the right to privacy, the state 
ends up implicitly compelling us to engage in certain sexual acts and not others.  The 
normalization that Rubenfeld so decries occurs not only through laws prohibiting 
certain acts, but also by the social stigma that attaches to sexual acts that, although 
legally permitted, require the suspect appeal to privacy and its theory of tolerance.   
Thus, Rubenfeld is caught in a catch-22: his reason for the right to privacy (i.e., his 
contention that the problem of normalization will disappear) pushes against its very 
adoption.  In other words, Rubenfeld’s justification fails on its own terms. The 
constitutional right to privacy, then, needs to be rejected. 
Sandel’s panacea to this very real problem of tolerance is a move toward a 
regime of acceptance.  He argues that the solution is to create another, legitimate 
standard to stand alongside the traditional procreative one. By touting the obvious 
merits to gay intimacy (such relations are similarly valuable and fulfilling), the state 
via judicial opinions can set up another norm.  Thus, gay sex, under an acceptance 
regime, is no longer just tolerated but is actually accepted as another legitimate 
sexual activity.  He writes that a “fuller respect would require, if not admiration, at 
least some appreciation of the lives homosexuals live.”24   
However, what about sex that is anonymous or purely physical such as the 
paradigmatic one-night stand or even the consensual bathhouse orgy?  Would Sandel 
have us publicly articulate the valuable qualities of such sexual acts as well?  This 
seems trickier. How many standards or norms do we create?25  In fact, how do we 
                                                                
24 SANDEL, supra note 15, at 107. 
25 In fact, appeal to suspect classification seems similarly problematic.  The experimenting 
college student may not be gay but her decision to sleep with someone of the same sex should 
still be protected.   A repudiation of morals legislation may very well render the doctrine of 
suspect classification obsolete.  After all, this doctrine came about in Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating anti-miscegenation statute).  It seems that such laws (including 
segregation laws like the one in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)) would not pass the 
re-conceptualized rational review that I offer in this article.  What would the state appeal to in 
justifying such legislation?  Claims of white supremacy and racial inferiority, for instance, 
invariably appeal only to mere morality—that is, some race is superior to another.  There is no 
legitimate harm here; rather, it is some conception of morality that stands behind such 
legislation.  In fact, the rationale that mixing of the races is bad is just as irrational as the claim 
that gay sex is a sin.  Both appeal to mere prejudice.  There is no evidence that such acts are 
harmful. Consequently, both fail a rational review where mere morals legislation is 
impermissible.  In this way, race-based affirmative action programs would not suffer the same 
fate because, unlike their irrational counterparts—segregation or miscegenation, they can 
appeal to some non-moral reason, such as remedying the harm of historical discrimination.  
Still, this argument, as it applies to suspect classification, needs a much more robust defense.  
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even go about extolling the virtues of these sexual practices?  The simple point is 
that while I may find no redeeming value in a one-night stand, someone else may.  
The problem with a regime of acceptance is that Sandel ends up fighting morals 
legislation with more morality.  But two wrongs certainly do not make a right.   
Ultimately, Sandel sees the choice as resting only between tolerance and acceptance.  
This article submits that by repudiating morals legislation—that is, by rejecting mere 
morality as a legitimate purpose under rational review—we may adopt a third, more 
promising alternative.  Rather than articulating numerous problematic standards of 
legitimacy and fighting morality with more morality, constitutional law ought to be 
seen as having no standard and no norm of sexual activity.  Gay and straight sex 
share the same status due to the fact that the state has no legitimate reason to prohibit 
either.   
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORALS LEGISLATION AND THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY 
In order to avoid the problematic right to privacy and simultaneously secure our 
freedom without falling into the trap of acceptance, constitutional law need only 
prohibit morals legislation.  That is, we must re-conceptualize rational review 
analysis.  Morals legislation includes those laws or regulations that are based solely 
on morality.  In these cases, morality “rationales appear, at times, in their purest form 
as the sole explicit rationale for government action.”26  Rather than appeal to harm or 
the general welfare, these laws look only to morality.   
Traditionally, such laws passed rational review, which requires that the 
regulation serve a legitimate purpose and that it be rationally related to that purpose.  
It is the first part of this doctrine—the legitimate purpose requirement—that is most 
relevant here.  The Court views the conventional police powers of the state as 
sufficient for meeting the legitimate purpose test.27 Specifically, legislation passes 
rational review if enacted to protect the “health, safety, and morals of the general 
public.”28 As I argue later in this article, the fact that Bowers v. Hardwick 29 upholds 
morals legislation will be of central importance.  
                                                           
 
 
For now, recognizing that the suspect classification doctrine may not be as normatively 
problematic as substantive due process, I simply focus on the right to privacy. 
26Goldberg, supra note 4, at 1244.  While Goldberg also believes that Lawrence rejects 
such pure morals legislation, she does not find such a decision revolutionary.  I submit that her 
failure to do so stems from the fact that she does not realize the important (and consequential) 
relationship between such legislation and the right to privacy. 
27Such police powers are reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.  
28PAUL BREST, ET. AL. PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING:  CASES AND 
MATERIALS  351 (2000) (emphasis added).  See D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government 
Purposes and State Enforcement of Morality, U. ILL. L. REV. 67 (1993) (examining the 
philosophical and legal justifications and applications of rational review—specifically moral 
legislation in the context of due process and equal protection).  See also Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
29478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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Morality alone, not just health and safety, has served as a legitimate justification 
for legislation under rational review.30  For example, in upholding an Indiana statute 
prohibiting all-nude dancing in public establishments, the Court in Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc. explicitly stated that the purpose of the statute was to protect “societal 
order and morality.”31 The Court went on to write that the “traditional police power 
of the States is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and 
morals, and we have upheld such a basis for legislation.”32 Since the Court held that 
the statute did not directly encroach upon constitutionally protected activities, it did 
not evaluate the law under a strict scrutiny standard.  It is this central tenet that 
Lawrence v. Texas repudiates, thereby opening the way for the rejection of the right 
to privacy.   
Richard Posner also seems to reject morals legislation.  He argues that sexuality 
ought to be approached functionally.  He advocates an understanding of sexual 
activity that is “resolutely secular, scientific in either a broad or narrow sense.”33  As 
he rightly points out, Devlin does not nor could not support his famous claim that 
allowing gay sex would lead to “national disintegration.”34 Devlin makes gestures to 
the conclusion that “a recognized morality is as necessary to society as, say, a 
recognized government,” but simply fails to offer the necessary evidence.35 Moral 
condemnation then, turns out an improper justification.  The state will be hard 
pressed to find an appropriate reason to condemn any consensual adult relationships.  
The concept of prohibiting morals legislation is certainly not a novel one.  In fact, 
much liberal political theory, under the banner of neutrality, holds that legislation 
cannot be based solely on comprehensive moral or religious viewpoints.  Such 
rationales are seen as illegitimate.36   What scholars have failed to realize, however, 
is that such a repudiation of morals legislation renders the right to privacy obsolete.   
For example, Sandel correctly captures the conception of the liberal state as 
prohibiting morals legislation, yet goes on to articulate the problem of tolerance 
inherent in the right to privacy.37 He states that “[t]he principle that government must 
be neutral among conceptions of the good life finds further constitutional expression 
                                                                
30See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498.  Justice Goldberg’s concurrence admits that the 
“discouraging of extra-marital relations” (only sex within marriage is worthwhile) is a 
“legitimate subject of state concern.” Id. (emphasis added). 
31501 U.S. 560, 568 (1991). 
32Id.  
33RICHARD POSNER,  SEX AND REASON  220 (1992). 
34Id. at 234. 
35Id. See also Devlin, Lord Patrick, Morals and the Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 68 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 1977); Hart, H.L.A. Immorality and Treason, in MORALITY AND 
THE LAW (Richard Wasserstrom ed., 1971).  
36See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); BRIAN 
BARRY, THEORIES OF JUSTICE (1989); JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:  
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans.) 
(2001); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987); JOHN RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE  OWE  EACH  OTHER (1998). 
37SANDEL, supra note 15,  at 91-119. 
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in the area of privacy rights.”38  Privacy is assumed, incorrectly, to be integral to this 
prohibition on morals legislation.  It is no wonder that Sandel offers acceptance as an 
alternative.  He, like others, misses the conceptual point: we do not need a right to 
privacy as long as the state cannot appeal to mere morality in justifying legislation.  
If mere morality is insufficient, then the state has no good reason to prohibit 
certain sexual practices or even to limit the institution of civil marriage to 
heterosexual couples.  For instance, the following rationales for state legislation are 
illegitimate under this re-conceptualized rational review: the virtuous path of 
monogamy; God deems gay sex, and even certain kinds of heterosexual sex, a sin; 
oral sex between men is disgusting; marriage is a holy bond between only a man and 
a woman.  If moral disgust is seen as insufficient to pass rational review, we have no 
need for the problematic right to privacy.  In fact, freedom is enhanced by the 
rejection of both privacy and morals legislation.  At the very least, a ban on morals 
legislation secures the liberty we previously and problematically protected via a right 
to privacy. 
Deeming mere morality an illegitimate reason under rational review not only 
secures our freedom.  It also avoids problematic appeals to substantive due process 
and tolerance.  First, the textual argument against the right to privacy is immediately 
avoided.  By repudiating legislation that curtails consensual sexual behavior on the 
ground that such legislation does not serve a legitimate purpose, we simply avoid 
any appeal to substantive due process.  We, therefore, do not need to search the 
Constitution for this enigmatic right to privacy, and the problematic pedigree of 
Lochner in grounding rights in substantive due process is circumvented. 
Second, and more importantly, the problem of tolerance inherent in the right to 
privacy is altogether not present under this re-conceptualized rational review.  But 
rather than moving toward acceptance and articulating another standard of valuable 
sexual relations, as Sandel would have us do, the ban on morals legislation refuses to 
endorse any standard.  A simpler, less problematic solution is to simply reject the 
right to privacy and adopt this new understanding of rational review.  Thus, all kinds 
of activities are permitted for the very same reason, namely that the state has no 
legitimate reason to prohibit any of them.  Consequently, my gay sex life, her 
polygamous one-night stands, and their monogamous straight relationship are all 
protected for the same reason.  Under this reformed version of rational review, 
purged of the right to privacy, legislation prohibiting straight sex and legislation 
prohibiting sodomy are both unconstitutional.  Gay sex, straight sex, and 
polygamous sex are all justified by the same principle.  There is no disparity in status 
and we have avoided the pitfalls of both toleration and acceptance. 
IV. LAWRENCE’S REPUDIATION OF MORALS LEGISLATION 
Lawrence v. Texas, by invalidating a Texas sodomy statute, took an 
unprecedented step towards re-conceptualizing rational review by rejecting mere 
morality as a legitimate rationale.  My argument to support this reading consists of 
two parts. First, I briefly outline the constitutional history of the modern right to 
privacy and the often-overlooked relationship between rational review, morals 
legislation, and privacy protection.  Second, I interpret Lawrence as simultaneously 
                                                                
38Id. at 91. 
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repudiating morals legislation and laying the foundation for the necessary 
constitutional rejection of the right to privacy. 
With its decision in Griswold, which overturned a ban on contraception for 
married people, the Court articulated the modern right to privacy by appealing to the 
penumbra argument.39  By looking to the due process clause of the 14th 
Amendment,40 the Court held that a law banning the use of contraceptives for 
married individuals interferes with their right to privacy.41  
Since the legislation in Griswold implicated the right to privacy, the Court 
applied strict scrutiny.  The Court reasoned that the legislation “[could not] stand in 
light of the familiar principle” that a state purpose “to control or prevent activities 
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which 
sweep unnecessarily broadly.”42 Thus, the Court struck down the law, and held that 
the contraceptive ban did not meet this heightened standard of scrutiny because it 
was not narrowly tailored.43   
The modern right to privacy was expanded in Roe v. Wade to include the right to 
abort a fetus.44  In that decision, the Court reiterated the holdings of the other cases, 
reasoning that while the “Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of 
privacy[,]. . . the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee 
of certain areas or zones of privacy does exist.”45 The Court further held that this 
zone is “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate 
her pregnancy.”46 Having established that a woman’s decision whether to have an 
                                                                
39Griswold, 381 U.S. 485 (“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the 
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional arrangements.”).  
40“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
41 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
42Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)). 
43In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court, strictly on equal protection grounds, held that since the 
right to privacy allowed married couples the ability to use contraception, the right extended to 
unmarried couples as well. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
44Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The right to abortion is somewhat different from the 
right to engage in certain sexual acts.  Abortion is not a simple issue under either the regime of 
privacy or a regime that simply prohibits morals legislation sans privacy.  Certainly, even with 
privacy doctrine, murder would be impermissible no matter where it took place (in the home, 
on a street corner, etc.).  Thus, if the fetus is a person under the Constitution, there is a prima 
facie case against abortion under both regimes.  Leaving aside whether the fetus is a person 
with constitutional standing—no case has held that it is, abortion jurisprudence has, in fact, 
moved away from privacy to considerations of harm.  Roe secured the right to abortion via the 
right to privacy—in line with Griswold and Eisenstadt.  In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992) on the other hand, the Court moved to an undue burden (harm) standard to 
maintain a woman’s right to choose.  This appeal to harm to justify abortion avoids the appeal 
to a mere moral consideration. The harm here is the disadvantage only the woman suffers in 
bearing children.  Thus, remedying this harm may very well involve allowing her to abort.  
For an excellent discussion of this shift in abortion case law see the introduction of   
ABORTION:  THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 1965-2000 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2nd ed. 2001).  
45Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
46Id. at 153. 
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abortion falls within the zone of privacy, the Court acknowledged that “some state 
regulation in areas protected by the right to privacy is appropriate.”47 It is just that 
when fundamental rights are implicated, the “regulation[s] limiting these rights may 
be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’ and . . . legislative enactments must 
be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.”48 The Court 
ultimately held that there was no compelling state interest to warrant the privacy 
infringement.   
In this way, Roe, like Griswold, did not consider the law under rational review.  
Since both regulations, the prohibition on contraceptive use and the prohibition on 
abortion, interfered with the right to privacy, the Court applied strict scrutiny. 
Unfortunately, as long as morals legislation—legislation that is based not on the 
health and safety of citizens (the prevention of harm) but on a specific conception of 
morality—continues to pass rational review, the right to privacy will invariably be 
needed.  As mentioned earlier, the concept of “tolerance” relates to permitting a 
deviation from the standard.   Accordingly, while certain kinds of non-procreative 
sex may be deemed immoral by a polity, tolerance allows such behavior to be 
begrudgingly permitted. In Griswold, for example, the “deviant” behavior was the 
use of contraception in the bedroom.  Effectively, privacy is our defense against 
morals legislation.  By way of strict scrutiny, it sweeps under the rug private 
behavior that, though not harmful, is deemed immoral or “deviant” by the majority.  
Unfortunately, case law does not explicitly articulate this relationship.  In fact, as I 
argue below, the Court in Bowers fails to follow this very principle of tolerance. As a 
result, constitutional theory has not noticed that a repudiation of morals legislation 
renders the right to privacy obsolete.   
Following Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, it seems reasonable that gay sex would 
have come to be located within the zone of privacy.  Again, even if a polity may 
characterize certain consensual sexual behavior as immoral, privacy ought to permit 
such victimless activity that occurs behind closed doors.  This is, after all, the very 
purpose of tolerance.  In Bowers, however, the Court held that the right of privacy 
could not protect gay sex between consenting adults in the bedroom.49   It upheld a 
Georgia sodomy statute that, as applied, primarily affected gays.50  The Bowers 
Court commits two mistakes, the first more egregious than the second.  First, even in 
admitting that private consensual acts of sodomy are not harmful, but simply 
offensive or immoral,51 it failed to afford such behavior protection under the right to 
privacy. That is, Bowers did not follow privacy’s own internal logic.  It failed to 
enforce tolerance.  Second, the opinion reaffirms the constitutional principle that 
mere morality alone can justify laws under rational review.   As a result, while 
Bowers is (at least from this author’s perspective) undoubtedly the most haunting 
decision of the modern right to privacy cases, it is for our purposes, also the most 
illuminating.   
                                                                
47Id. at 154. 
48Id. at 155. 
49Bowers, 478 U.S. 186. 
50Id. at 187. 
51Id. at 195.  The majority admits that gay sex is a “victimless crime.” 
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Bowers addressed both types of challenges outlined above.  First, as a threshold 
matter, it found that gay sex did not trigger the right to privacy.  By appealing to, 
among other things, early American history and the common law’s proscription 
against gay sex, it held that such activity was not a part of the due process right to 
privacy.  For conduct to qualify as a fundamental right under due process, it must be 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.”52 The Court concluded that sodomy is not such an activity.  But 
here is where the opinion goes wrong.  The right to privacy and its corresponding 
regime of tolerance have deep-seated roots.  After all, Locke’s Letter Concerning 
Toleration, published anonymously for the first time in 1689, stands as testament to 
the historical pedigree of the liberal principle of tolerance.53  The protection via the 
right to privacy is no doubt “deeply rooted.”  By its very nature, however, such a 
right protects behavior that is “deviant” and abnormal, that is not deeply rooted or 
popular.  Just as the rights to free speech and due process have a rich tradition, so too 
does the right to privacy and the commitment to tolerance.  Yet, the activities that 
privacy allegedly protects must be anything but traditional. After all, such activities 
are deviations from the norm.  Simply put, if an activity were deeply rooted in our 
nation’s history and tradition, such as procreative sex within the bounds of marriage, 
there would be no need for the right to privacy.  Acts that are so rooted and implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty seem anything but private.   
In fact, it is as if the Court requires that the majority tradition and culture 
“accept” the activity before the right to privacy will apply.  This seems to turn the 
right to privacy and the regime of tolerance on its very head. In Griswold, no one 
claimed that contraceptive use has a deeply rooted past.  Rather, tolerance (the right 
to privacy) itself has the long pedigree.   The principle may be deep seated, but the 
activities it seeks to protect invariably are not.  This is the function of such a right.  It 
is because this non-harmful but offensive practice is carried out in the bedroom by a 
minority that the right to privacy is needed. Sodomy’s alleged abnormal status 
pushes for tolerance.  Thus, it would be a mistake to simply criticize the Bowers 
opinion for characterizing gay sex as abnormal and non-traditional.  Even if gay sex 
is a “deviant” sexual practice that takes place behind closed doors, it is this 
conclusion that deems it suitable and proper for protection under the right to privacy.  
If it were otherwise, privacy would not be needed. 
Of course, I reject this regime of tolerance, because the protection it offers is not 
genuinely equal.  Still, the Bowers majority should have gone at least this far.  The 
conventional, and for me suspect, principle of privacy has the perverse advantage of 
distinguishing gay sex from gay marriage.  The majority may find the former activity 
disgusting and immoral, but as long as it is done in private, as was the case in 
Bowers, it should be tolerated.  Marriage, on the other hand, is not a private activity, 
and as a result, does not implicate the right to privacy or the commitment to 
tolerance.  Here, we are not shielded from morals legislation because the activity is 
public in nature.  For some, the upshot of a right to privacy and its regime of 
tolerance is the ability to permit gay sex, but not gay marriage.  Bowers should have 
at least endorsed this troublesome distinction.  This concern with privacy, however, 
                                                                
52Id. at 193. 
53John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A 
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003).   
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is entirely unnecessary if we simply reject morals legislation and declare that mere 
morality is insufficient to pass rational review.  
The second part of the Bowers decision declares the exact opposite.  It maintains 
that mere disgust is sufficient to satisfy rational review.  That is, having bizarrely cut 
off the appeal to privacy, Bowers also rejects appeal to rational review.  Since gay 
sex does not fall within the zone of privacy (an argument that seems to fail on its 
own terms), the Bowers Court considers the sodomy statute under rational review.  
Significantly, in the last paragraph of its decision, the Court states: 
Even if the conduct at issue here is not a fundamental right, respondent 
asserts that there must be a rational basis for the law and that there is none 
in this case other than the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate 
in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.  This is 
said to be an inadequate rationale to support the law. The law, however, is 
constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing 
essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process 
Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.  Even respondent makes no 
such claim, but insists that majority sentiments about the morality of 
homosexuality should be declared inadequate.  We do not agree, and are 
unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 states should be invalidated 
on this basis. 54
 Bowers, thus, validated the state’s ability to legislate morals. Undoubtedly, the 
sodomy statute was based solely on society’s disapproval of homosexuality, or at 
least gay sex.  The Bowers decision, then, stands for the proposition that such 
justifications are permissible.  The decision in Lawrence must be seen as reacting to 
the Bowers’ rationale, as eschewing morals legislation and allowing for the rejection 
of the right to privacy.  
The facts of Lawrence were as follows.  Police officers from Harris County in 
Houston, Texas entered an apartment on a report that there was a weapons 
disturbance.55  The officers observed two men, John Lawrence and Tyron Garner, 
engaging in a sexual act.56  The two were arrested and convicted under Texas Penal 
Code 21.06, which made it a crime for a person of one sex to engage in oral or anal 
sex with someone else of the same sex.57  The defendants appealed their convictions 
on due process and equal protection and grounds.58  The Fourteenth District Court of 
Appeals of Texas affirmed the convictions, basing its decision on the controlling 
status of Bowers.59  The Supreme Court reversed.  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Kennedy overturned both parts of Bowers.60 First, the majority held that sodomy is 
                                                                
54Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, at 196 (emphasis added). 
55 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 




60Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 
561.  Justice O’Conner concurred in invalidating the statute but refused to join in the 
 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss3/6
2005-06] REPUDIATING MORALS LEGISLATION 459 
protected under the constitutional right to privacy. Second, and far more 
interestingly, it held that a law fails rational review if based solely on morality. 
The Lawrence opinion squarely addresses the Bowers decision.  The Court says 
as much when it “conclude[s] [that this] case requires us to address whether Bowers 
itself has continuing validity.”61 Justice Kennedy spends most of the first part of the 
opinion arguing that sodomy deserves protection under the right to privacy.  On the 
privacy prong of the argument he re-appraises the notion that the proscription against 
sodomy has longstanding roots.  In countering the Bowers reasoning, the Lawrence 
Court observes that not only was there an “absence of legal prohibitions focusing on 
homosexual conduct”62 in early American history, but also sodomy laws were, in 
fact, rarely enforced “against consenting adults acting in private.”63 The Court 
comments that it “was not until the 1970’s that any State singled out same-sex 
relations for criminal prosecution, and only nine States have done so.”64  
Moreover, the Lawrence Court counters the assertion in Bowers that history has 
condemned this type of activity.65  Even before Bowers, the Wolfenden Report, in 
1957, recommended the “repeal of laws punishing homosexual conduct” to the 
British Parliament.66 Additionally, the European Court of Human Rights, five years 
before Bowers, held in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, that sodomy laws were invalid 
under the European Convention of Human Rights.67 As a post-Bowers decision, the 
Lawrence opinion cites Planned Parenthood v. Casey68 as reaffirming “the 
substantive force of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”69  
                                                           
 
 
overturning of Bowers. Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  O’Conner put forth a novel 
rational review plus argument. Id. at 579-81.  She argued that morality cannot be used in 
rational review analysis when there is a prima facie equal protection claim, as was the case 
here—the sodomy statute only applied to gay sex.  The majority clearly refused to entertain 
the equal protection argument. Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Justices Rehnquist and 
Thomas. 
61Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
62Id. at 568. 
63Id. at 569. 
64Id. 
65Such exhortations are, of course, unnecessary given the purpose of privacy –to protect 
activities that do not have such an entrenched tradition.  The Lawrence majority failed to see 
the internal problem with the reasoning in Bowers.  Behavior that is not harmful, but deemed 
non-traditional, deviating, or offensive is the paradigmatic kind of activity privacy seeks to 
protect. 
66Id. at 572-73. 
67Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573. 
68505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding Roe’s central holding, but replacing the trimester 
framework with viability).  
69Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573. The majority specifically avoided application of the Equal 
Protection Clause. The statute in Lawrence specifically outlawed gay sex (the one in Bowers 
outlawed sodomy between same sex couples and opposite sex ones).  If, as the Lawrence 
Court realizes, it were to “hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some 
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More importantly, in overturning Bowers, the Court also reconsiders the role of 
morality in rational review analysis.  This is the second component of the Lawrence 
opinion.  While morality has traditionally served as a legitimate purpose satisfying 
rational review, the Court in Lawrence delegitimizes this appeal to morality.  Toward 
the end of the opinion, Justice Kennedy quotes Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bowers, in 
which he countered the two holdings of the Bowers majority (that the right to privacy 
does not include the right to have gay sex and that legislation can be based on mere 
morality).70 The Lawrence court explicitly relies on Stevens’ words to invalidate the 
gay-specific sodomy statute: 
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear.  First, the fact 
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law 
prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.  Second, individual 
decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical 
relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of 
‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by 
unmarried as well as married persons.71  
This is the crux of the Lawrence decision.  It expands the right of privacy to 
include gay sex, but more importantly, it deems mere morality an insufficient basis 
for legislation. The state cannot legislate merely on grounds of morality.  Claiming 
that homosexuality is wrong or an improper lifestyle is not enough.  To be sure, the 
ruling ought to be interpreted as applying to all areas of life.  It would be a mistake to 
interpret the decision as holding that morality could not serve as a basis for 
legislation only when it regulates private behavior.   
By quoting the dissent, the Lawrence Court heralds in a new understanding of 
rational review.  The opinion states that morality is “not [a] sufficient reason for 
upholding a law prohibiting the practice [of sodomy].”72 It does not say that laws that 
interfere with fundamental rights such as the right to privacy cannot be based on 
morals.  In fact, the Court states that the gay sodomy statute furthers no “legitimate 
state interest.”73 This is undoubtedly the language of rational review, which applies 
to all regulations.  The majority could have said that the statute furthers no 
“compelling state interest,” thereby leaving the door open for morality to justify non-
fundamental-interest-violating laws, but it did not.  It thus gave rational review new 
life.   
                                                           
 
 
might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit 
conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants.”  Id. 
70Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (1986). 
71Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, at 216 
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
72Id. at 577. 
73Id. at 578. 
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The second part of the Lawrence decision, rejecting morality as the only basis for 
legislation, may seem controversial.  By eschewing tolerance and endorsing a regime 
where there is no standard of appropriate sexual activity, it lays the foundation for 
the ultimate rejection of the right to privacy.  This reading is supported by Justice 
Scalia’s perceptive dissent.  Justice Scalia hones in on the real import of the decision 
when he writes that most “of the [majority] opinion has no relevance to its actual 
holding—that the Texas statute ‘furthers no legitimate state interest which can 
justify’ its application to petitioners under rational-basis review.”74  To be sure, 
Justice Scalia believes that the majority opinion renders suspect laws “against 
fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity.”75  In so far as 
these laws are solely based on morality, may be right.  However, and we will revisit 
this issue towards the end of the essay, as long as an appropriate justification can be 
given, such as the prevention of harm, they pass rational review.   Even if Justice 
Scalia exaggerates the ramifications of the holding, I do agree with his understanding 
of it.  
What Justice Scalia does not mention in his dissent is that the majority could 
have avoided the discussion of privacy altogether, simply by holding that laws 
cannot be based solely on morality.  As discussed in Part II, once this is appreciated, 
there is no need for the problematic right to privacy.  Why shield gay sex from state 
regulation (subject laws prohibiting it to strict scrutiny), if such laws cannot be based 
solely on morality? Certainly, the legislation in Griswold would have fallen if 
morality could not have been used to justify it.  We would not have been burdened 
with the problematic right to privacy if the Court, in any of the modern sexual 
freedom cases, had simply proclaimed, as the Lawrence court finally did, that morals 
legislation is impermissible.  Again, privacy is needed to protect the minority from 
such legislation.  Once we reject the appeal to mere morality, privacy serves no 
function.  It becomes obsolete. 
 It was a mere moral consideration, the belief that sex should be carried out 
within the bonds of marriage for procreative purposes, that lead to the Griswold 
regulation.  Rather than seek to include such activities within the ambit of privacy by 
fighting to characterize the proscription against such behavior as violating due 
process, constitutional law need only deem as illegitimate legislation based solely on 
comprehensive moral or religious doctrines.   
The Lawrence Court, then, took an unnecessary step in acknowledging that gay 
sex falls within the zone of privacy.  It could have simply articulated the new 
standard for rational review.   Why did the Court seek to do both things?  Why not 
simply state that rational review fails if based solely on morality or on a certain 
conception of the good, and leave it at that?  The Court’s intention could have been 
one of strategy.  Just five months after Lawrence was decided, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, under the Massachusetts Constitution, invalidated the state’s 
refusal to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples.76   It was the marriage issue 
that the Lawrence majority was worried about.  If the majority had not also expanded 
the right to privacy, if it had simply said we no longer need privacy and had 
                                                                
74Id. at 586. 
75Id. at 599. 
76Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (2003). 
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invalidated the sodomy law under rational review, the ban on same-sex marriage 
would seem blatantly illegitimate.  By choosing to additionally decide the issue on 
privacy grounds, the majority gives the semblance that the decision does not 
implicate behavior such as gay marriage, which occurs outside the bedroom.  
Perhaps the gesture to privacy protection is to assure us that a conventional regime of 
tolerance is still in place, allowing us to distinguish between gay sex and gay 
marriage.  In other words, we may safely allow the former, but not the latter.   The 
Court says as much when it disingenuously writes that this case “does not involve 
public conduct or prostitution.  It does not involve whether the government must 
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”77  
Yet, if the majority’s purpose was truly to limit the holding to intimate activities, 
it did not have to further hold that morality serves no legitimate state interest.  It did 
not need to give teeth to the otherwise permissive standard of rational review.  The 
Lawrence Court did not have to go as far as it did in order to strike down sodomy 
laws.  By its very reasoning it implicates much more.  It goes farther than tolerance.   
Admittedly, the language of privacy occupies a primary role in the Court’s 
opinion.  For example, from the very start, Justice Kennedy writes that liberty 
protects us from intrusion in “private places.”78  Later he writes that the due process 
clause protects “private conduct.”79  To be sure, most of the opinion makes this 
conventional right to privacy argument.  Conceding that, I suggest that the argument 
on privacy is a dog and pony show, or at the very least it should be read as such.  
Justice Kennedy spends almost seven of the eight pages of the Lawrence opinion 
demonstrating that gay sex implicates the right to privacy.  Gay sex, like the use of 
contraceptives, falls within the zone of privacy and is generally beyond government 
regulation.  Having put those at ease who fear the day when same-sex marriage is 
permitted, he  spells out the end of morals legislation in the last page of the decision.  
It is this reasoning that opens the way for the rejection of privacy and the demise of 
legislation based solely on morality.   
Not distracted by the show, Justice Scalia quite rightly points out the following: 
If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is ‘no legitimate state 
interest’ for purposes of proscribing that conduct . . . what justification 
could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to 
homosexual couples exercising ‘[t]he liberty protected by the 
Constitution’?  Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the 
sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.  This case ‘does not involve’ 
the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that 
principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of the Court.  
Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us, this is so.80
Scalia is absolutely correct that there is no justification for the ban on gay marriage, 
because this would invariably involve the now illegitimate appeal to certain 
conceptions of morality. Appeal to the sanctity of marriage would be insufficient 
                                                                
77Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
78Id. at 562. 
79Id. at 564. 
80Id. at 605 (citation omitted). 
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under rational review to justify the prohibition on same-sex marriage.  In this way, 
with no right to privacy, laws against gay sex and same-sex marriage fail for the 
same reason.  Although the majority could have been more forthright and candid 
with its decision, perhaps the gratuitous right to privacy argument was necessary for 
other justices to sign on to the opinion or to make the decision palatable to their 
audience.  Maybe the justices, like most liberal theorists, failed to realize that a right 
to privacy is obsolete under a repudiation of morals legislation. This may very well 
be the most likely explanation.  We can only speculate.   
In any case, Lawrence ought to be interpreted as laying the foundation for the 
ultimate rejection of the right to privacy.  Undoubtedly, as more cases arise under 
this new conception of rational review, I hope constitutional law scholars and 
litigants will realize that the right to privacy is no longer needed.  Lawrence is 
groundbreaking, not because it holds that gay sex implicates the right to privacy.81    
Rather, the true power of Lawrence comes from its holding that no law can be based 
simply on certain conceptions of the good on grounds of mere morality.   
Now Rubenfeld finds this reading of Lawrence unpersuasive.82  Sharing some of 
Justice Scalia’s concerns, Rubenfeld contends that if the opinion truly repudiates 
morals legislation, it calls into question laws against prostitution, bigamy, polygamy, 
obscenity, and even racial discrimination in the workplace.  He maintains that 
legislating against these activities invariably requires appeal to morality, and thus 
finds them indistinguishable from sodomy.  For example, he writes that laws against 
racial discrimination would “certainly be unconstitutional under a principle that the 
state may not legislate morality.  Discrimination inflicts no force or fraud on 
anyone.”83  Thus, according to Rubenfeld, Lawrence cannot stand for the proposition 
that morals legislation is unconstitutional.  If it did, it would have too far-reaching 
implications for the present state of constitutional law. 
I find his argument too hasty and exaggerated. Sodomy laws can certainly be 
distinguished from prohibitions against prostitution, bigamy, polygamy, and 
obscenity.  Feminists have argued that the latter four can lead to the domination and 
subjugation of women84—a claim that certainly cannot be made in regards to gay 
sex. Moreover, laws that prohibit discrimination in the workplace, such as Title VII, 
are not based on mere appeals to morality.  Rather, and Rubenfeld seems to miss this 
point, such laws aim to remedy some notion of harm—here, the very real chance of 
not securing a job on account of one’s unchosen minority status.  For example, 
having an employer discriminate against you on account of your race undoubtedly 
harms you, leaving you without a job or a livelihood.  Additionally, such 
discrimination reaffirms the very real structures of power and domination.  It seems 
outrageous to claim that this kind of discrimination is a harmless activity like 
                                                                
81The right to privacy argument should have carried the day in Bowers.  The classic liberal 
mantra,“what you do in your bedroom is your business,” should have worked in 1986. 
82Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 184-90. 
83 Id. at 189. 
84See, e.g., CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); ANDREA DWORKIN, 
PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); Susan Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for 
Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? (Joshua Cohen & Mathew Howard 
eds., 1999).  
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consensual sodomy, invariably requiring appeal to mere morality to legislate against. 
Whereas sodomy laws regulate harmless behavior, laws like Title VII seem entirely 
inapposite as they prevent very real harm.  
Moreover, in carefully analyzing the Court’s review of alleged morals legislation, 
Suzanne Goldberg contends that even before Lawrence, morals legislation was 
already headed out the door. For example, in Reynolds v. US85 and Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton,86 the Court partially appealed to non-morality based (neutral) 
language in failing to provide constitutional protection for bigamy and obscenity, 
respectively.87 The Reynolds decision, as Goldberg interestingly points out, never 
once uses the word “morality.”  In that decision the Court argues that “polygamy 
leads to the patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities, 
fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in 
connection with monogamy,”88 thereby looking to harm and not just morality. 
Similarly, in Paris Adult Theatre I, the Court noted that this case “goes beyond 
whether someone, or even the majority, considers the conduct depicted as ‘wrong’ or 
‘sinful’.”89 This was not the language of Bowers where the majority’s moral 
disapproval was deemed sufficient on its own to uphold sodomy laws.  Instead, the 
Paris Adult Theatre I decision reasoned that “States have the power to make a 
morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in 
such material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger the 
public safety, or to jeopardize . . . the States’ right . . . to maintain a decent 
society.”90  Unsurprisingly, in upholding sodomy laws, Bowers, unlike Reynolds and 
Paris Adult Theatre I, did not rely on even a partial appeal to the prevention of 
harm, to neutral, non-moral rationales.  Thus, repudiating morals legislation need not 
lead to Rubenfeld’s and Scalia’s slippery slope.   
Still, reading Lawrence as overturning the sodomy statute on the basis of rational 
review alone—declaring morals legislation unconstitutional—may very well call into 
question the ban on gay marriage, and rightly so.  After all, it is only this result that 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion disingenuously tries to protect against. Under my reading, 
the ban on gay marriage must fall.  Eventually, the right to privacy will become 
obsolete, carrying no constitutional purchase.  
V. CONCLUSION 
A constitutional rejection of morals legislation renders the right to privacy 
obsolete.  Thus, Constitutional law can finally reject the problematic right to privacy 
by simply refashioning rational review. As long as appeal to mere morality is not 
enough to pass rational review, such review will be robust enough to ensure our 
liberty.  To be sure, repudiation of morals legislation has consequences that go 
beyond the confines of the bedroom.  Lawrence has taken the bold step of ushering 
                                                                
85 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
86 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
87 Goldberg, supra note 4, at 1261-81. 
88 Id. at 1264 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166). 
89 Id. at 1269 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69). 
90 Id. at 1270 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69). 
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in a new constitutional regime in which the right to privacy is obsolete.  
Constitutional legal thought sans the right to privacy has just begun.   
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